Case Study 1

## Codes

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

## Codes\\Academic Interaction

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Academia |  | 2 | 9 |

## Codes\\Cyber

All mentions of cyber in non-cyber strategic documents, and nuanced cyber language that doesn’t “fit” in other IR coding categories.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Critical Infrastructure | Cyber threats to CI/KR | 1 | 3 |
| Cyber Capabilities |  | 1 | 1 |
| Cyber Security |  | 2 | 9 |
| Digital Infrastructure |  | 3 | 24 |

## Codes\\Policy Engineering Tasks

The seven policy engineering tasks that ground the theory-practice alignment/misalignment assessment methodology.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Policy Engineering Tasks | The application of knowledge, principles, and methods to the solution of specific public problems in a given political environment. Zelikow’s framework framework is comprised of seven distinct, iterative tasks that need not occur in chronological order. | 4 | 183 |
| Design | Mechanism by which a strategy is converted into operational plans (Policy Engineering Task 4) | 0 | 0 |
| Implementation | The act of performing the tasks necessary to operationalize the strategy (Policy Engineering Task 5) | 3 | 25 |
| Capability Development |  | 1 | 6 |
| Organization of Forces |  | 1 | 2 |
| Partnership Enhancement |  | 1 | 9 |
| Planning\_Conducting Operations |  | 1 | 2 |
| Talent Management\_Readiness |  | 1 | 3 |
| Use of New Authorities |  | 0 | 0 |
| Maintenance | Routine diplomacy designed to perpetuate the utility of the policy (Policy Engineering Task 6) | 0 | 0 |
| National Interests | A non-operational goal used to rationalize policy preferences (Policy Engineering Task 1) | 3 | 18 |
| Objective | An end state that the policy is supposed to accomplish (Policy Engineering Task 2) | 3 | 58 |
| Review | Periodic evaluation of a policy to assess alignment with national interests, objectives, strategy, design, and identify problems with implementation (Policy Engineering Task 7) | 1 | 77 |
| Strategy | The bridge between military power and political purpose (Policy Engineering Task 3) | 1 | 5 |

## Codes\\Theory\_Constructivism

Constructivism emphasizes the social meaning attached to behavior, and considers the convergence of socially constructed ideals as causal.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Constructivism |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Normative | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 4 | 108 |
| Domestic-International Interplay | National norms affect international politics. | 2 | 19 |
| Logic of Appropriateness | Actors internalize roles and rules as scripts to which they conform because they understand the behavior to be good, desirable, and appropriate. | 2 | 16 |
| Norm Entrepreneurs | Successful norm creation requires norm entrepreneurs and organizational or institutional platforms from which entrepreneurs act. | 4 | 40 |
| Security, Norms | Security comes from actors defaulting to generally accepted norms of behavior. (Causal mechanism: norms) | 4 | 19 |
| Soft Power | Soft power advantage goes to states whose dominant culture and ideas are closer to prevailing global norms. It increases in importance in the information age, but the ability to wield it is undermined by competing value propositions in the norm marketplace. | 3 | 14 |
| International Norms |  | 4 | 443 |
| Adopt | Adopt / adoption of norms | 1 | 1 |
| Agreement\_Normative |  | 3 | 9 |
| Behavior | Desired behavior / standards of behavior | 4 | 26 |
| Belief | Believe / belief | 1 | 7 |
| Collective\_Normative | As in, collective action The logic of collective action is that a change will be made for the common good and benefit the people in need. | 3 | 18 |
| Consensus |  | 3 | 18 |
| Culture |  | 2 | 16 |
| Identity |  | 1 | 7 |
| Ideology\_Ideas |  | 2 | 26 |
| Incentives | Incentive / Incentivizing | 3 | 20 |
| Institutionalization\_Institutionalize |  | 0 | 0 |
| Like Minded\_Normative |  | 4 | 11 |
| Moral |  | 2 | 6 |
| Multilateral\_Normative | Multilateral / Multistakeholder Cooperation among 3 or more actors based on generalized principles of conduct (Ruggie). | 2 | 16 |
| Norms |  | 4 | 46 |
| Partnerships\_Normative |  | 3 | 43 |
| Persuade | Persuade / persuasion | 1 | 4 |
| Principles |  | 4 | 30 |
| Regime |  | 2 | 2 |
| Relationships\_Normative |  | 3 | 13 |
| Rules\_Normative |  | 3 | 10 |
| Socialize | Socialization / Society | 0 | 0 |
| Soft Power |  | 2 | 16 |
| Standards | Standards of behavior | 3 | 35 |
| Subjective |  | 0 | 0 |
| Values\_Fundamental\_Universal |  | 4 | 62 |

## Codes\\Theory\_Cyber Persistence Theory

CPT describes a strategic environment based on initiative persistence (rather than offense dominance) that requires states to understand the logic of exploitation rather than coercion.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cyber Persistence |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Persistence | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 3 | 8 |
| Attribution, Difficult | Attribution is difficult and cost of entry is low. Secret capabilities are adaptive to anticipate numerous vulnerabilities, and signaling occurs after the fact. | 0 | 0 |
| Interconnected | Man-made, fluid, interconnected terrain creates a strategic environment of constant contact. | 3 | 8 |
| Operational Exploitation | Continuous operations and campaigns are exploitive (not coercive), using code to take advantage of others’ cyber vulnerabilities to gain strategic advantage. | 0 | 0 |
| Security, Operational Persistence | Security comes from operational persistence below the threshold of armed conflict, acting in anticipation of exploitable cyber vulnerabilities. (Causal mechanism: persistence amidst changes in security conditions) | 0 | 0 |
| Structural Characteristics | The structural characteristics of the cyber strategic environment rewards those who anticipate the exploitation of vulnerabilities, driving an imperative to persist in seeking the initiative. | 0 | 0 |
| Persistence |  | 3 | 52 |
| Agreed Competition |  | 0 | 0 |
| Compete | Compete / competition / competitive interaction | 0 | 0 |
| Constant Contact |  | 0 | 0 |
| Contest |  | 0 | 0 |
| Defend Forward |  | 0 | 0 |
| Dynamic |  | 1 | 2 |
| Exploitation | Exploitive / Exploit / exploitable cyber vulnerabilities | 1 | 6 |
| Fluid Boundaries | Fluid, malleable environment | 3 | 12 |
| Grappling |  | 0 | 0 |
| Grey Zone | Grey Zone Conflict / below threshold of armed conflict | 0 | 0 |
| Hunt Forward |  | 0 | 0 |
| Initiative |  | 0 | 0 |
| Interconnected |  | 3 | 26 |
| Man-made |  | 1 | 1 |
| Persistent Engagement | Persistent Engagement / Persist / Persistence | 0 | 0 |
| Resilience |  | 1 | 4 |
| Structure | Structural characteristics | 1 | 1 |

## Codes\\Theory\_Liberalism

NLI is a rational-actor model that views international institutions as causal in determining the likelihood of cooperation among sovereign states, thereby improving security.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Liberalism |  | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Liberalist | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 4 | 142 |
| Interdependence | Complex interdependence renders national economies more sensitive and vulnerable to events in other countries. The global nature of the Internet intensifies interdependence and demands cooperation. | 4 | 31 |
| International Cooperation | International cooperation is desirable and possible. Economic and Internet governance cooperation can drive politico-military cooperation. | 4 | 34 |
| Norms, Self-Interest | Norm conformance is driven by material self-interest. Actors construct and conform to norms because norms help them get what they want . | 4 | 15 |
| Rational, Share Power | States are primary (rational) actors, but they share power with non-state actors. | 4 | 30 |
| Security, Institutions | Security comes from leveraging institutions to foster cooperative relationships built on mutual trust. (Causal mechanism: institutions) | 4 | 27 |
| World as it ought to be | NLI is rooted in a normative, optimistic ideology that produced moralistic, prescriptive theories of political behavior based on how the world ought to be. | 2 | 5 |
| NLI |  | 4 | 878 |
| Absolute Gains |  | 1 | 2 |
| Agreement\_Cooperative |  | 4 | 17 |
| Alliance | Kegley and Raymond: normative standards reinforce alliance commitments in a culture of trust | 4 | 74 |
| Collaboration | With domestic and international partners | 4 | 73 |
| Collective\_Cooperative | As in, collective security Collective security can be understood as a flexible security arrangement in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and therefore commits to a collective response to threats to, and breaches of peace. | 4 | 22 |
| Communication |  | 2 | 7 |
| Consent |  | 1 | 2 |
| Cooperation | Cooperation and coordination Utopian explanation is cooperation based upon shared universal values. This falls within cosmopolitan theory (JS Mill). Integration is the result of universal norms and morality. | 4 | 85 |
| Economic |  | 4 | 99 |
| Global |  | 4 | 98 |
| Institutions | o Neoliberals stress the role of institutions, broadly defined as shared expectation of behavior that deserve formal assent and agreement o Realists believe that institutions are instruments of statecraft o Liberals: institutions foster cooperation o Realists: Institutions are only established if they help advance the goals that the state is seeking | 4 | 53 |
| Integration | "process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states." (Ernest Haas) Integration is a process relying on internalization by the actors and arises as a result of support from within the unit being integrated, such as the EU. | 4 | 25 |
| Interdependence |  | 4 | 27 |
| International Order | The International Order is defined as the body of rules, norms, and institutions that govern relations between the key players on the international stage. | 3 | 28 |
| Liberal |  | 0 | 0 |
| Like Minded\_Cooperative |  | 4 | 9 |
| Multilateral\_Cooperative | Multilateralism / Multistakeholder | 4 | 31 |
| Mutual Interests |  | 4 | 27 |
| Organizations |  | 4 | 31 |
| Partnerships\_Cooperative |  | 4 | 112 |
| Rational | Rational actor / Reasonable | 0 | 0 |
| Regime |  | 2 | 4 |
| Relationships\_Cooperative |  | 4 | 27 |
| Rules\_Cooperative | Rules and regulations | 3 | 11 |
| Trust |  | 2 | 14 |

## Codes\\Theory\_Realism

Descriptive theory based on a “pessimistic” view of human nature and the world as it is. States act in their own self interest to ensure their survival in an anarchic environment.

| **Name** | **Description** | **Files** | **References** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Realism | Structurationist ontological theory in which states are the primary actors, acting in their own self-interest to ensure survival in an environment of anarchy. | 0 | 0 |
| Core Assumptions\_Realist | Core assumptions are those foundational elements of a theory that underpin its causal logic. | 4 | 19 |
| Attribution, Achievable | Attribution is readily achievable. Government-controlled complex capabilities make the cost of entry is high, and signaling occurs before action. | 0 | 0 |
| Fixed Boundaries | State behavior is rooted in an international structure characterized by well-defined, fixed boundaries and territorial sovereignty. | 1 | 1 |
| Operational Restraint | The core strategic objective is to avoid operational contact through operational restraint. Security rests in the mind of the opponent—a psychological-political phenomenon—and is achieved through inaction on the part of one’s adversaries. | 2 | 8 |
| Rational, Maximize | States are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility. | 1 | 1 |
| Security, Credible Threat | Security is achieved through cost imposition or a credible threat of force through the use of known capabilities. (Causal mechanism: prospective threat of incontestable costs) | 3 | 5 |
| World as it is | Realism is rooted in descriptive theories based on a pessimistic view of human nature and the world as it is. | 1 | 4 |
| Deterrence |  | 4 | 201 |
| Anarchy |  | 1 | 1 |
| Balance of Power |  | 1 | 1 |
| Boundaries |  | 3 | 6 |
| Capabilities |  | 4 | 42 |
| Coercion | Coercion / coercive | 0 | 0 |
| Compel | Compel / Compellence | 1 | 1 |
| Consequences |  | 2 | 3 |
| Cost Benefit | Cost-benefit calculus | 1 | 1 |
| Costs | Impose costs / cost imposition | 0 | 0 |
| Counterforce |  | 1 | 1 |
| Countervalue |  | 0 | 0 |
| Credible | Credible / credibility | 2 | 2 |
| Cyberwar |  | 0 | 0 |
| Defeat |  | 1 | 11 |
| Deny | Denial / deny benefits | 2 | 3 |
| Deter | Deter / Deterrence / Deterrent / Deterring | 4 | 39 |
| Dissuade |  | 1 | 5 |
| Hard Power |  | 2 | 6 |
| Offense | Offense-defense balance | 0 | 0 |
| Penalty | Penalty / penalize | 0 | 0 |
| Persuade | Persuade / persuasion | 0 | 0 |
| Power |  | 2 | 2 |
| Prevent | Prevent / prevention | 4 | 18 |
| Punishment |  | 1 | 1 |
| Rational | Rational / rationality | 0 | 0 |
| Restraint |  | 2 | 2 |
| Retaliation |  | 3 | 7 |
| Self Interests |  | 2 | 8 |
| Self-Help |  | 0 | 0 |
| Signal | Signal / signaling | 1 | 2 |
| Threat |  | 4 | 26 |
| Use of Force |  | 4 | 13 |